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RECENT NINTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST LAW-JURISDICTIONAL SCOPE OF THE SHERMAN ACT-STATE
ACTION EXCEPTION-LEARNED PROFESSION ExCEPTION-Boddicker v.
Arizona State Dental Association, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 73 (1977).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Association,' the Ninth Circuit
held that the membership requirements of the American Dental Associa-
tion (ADA) and its constituent societies fell within the purview of the
Sherman Act (the Act).2 This decision is illustrative of the continued
expansion of Sherman Act jurisdiction by applying a liberal construction
of the interstate commerce requirement. 3 At the same time, the court
contracted the scope of recognized exceptions to the Act,4 thereby indi-
cating a reluctance to afford immunity to entities and individuals whose
conduct constitutes a violation of antitrust legislation.
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
Under the national network of dental societies established by the
ADA, the Arizona State Dental Association is a "constituent society" of
the ADA and the Central Arizona Dental Society is a "component
1. 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 73 (1977).
2. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. V 1975), provide in
pertinent part:
§ 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy declared ...to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony ....
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a felony ....
Id.
3. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1976);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 785 (1975).
4. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Hospital Bldg. Co. v.
Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
In contravention of the trend to expand liability under the Act, the Supreme Court
recently concluded that the enforcement of a ban on legal advertising by the Arizona State
Bar was exempt from liability under the state action doctrine. Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2698 (1977). See text accompanying notes 71-72 infra. Unlike the
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society" of the state association. 5 Pursuant to the by-laws of the ADA, a
dentist may not become a member of a constituent or component society
without first remitting dues and becoming a member of the ADA. As a
result of this arrangement, the ADA collected more than $6,000,000 in
annual membership dues in 1972 from dentists throughout the United
States.
Each of the three associations (the ADA, the state society and the local
society) was organized with the objective of improving public health and
the practice of dentistry.6 Membership in state and local societies is not a
prerequisite to the practice of dentistry in Arizona. However, the two
associations offer substantial benefits to their members, including con-
tinuing education programs, group insurance and entry into various
specialty organizations. The ADA provides its members with insurance
programs, dental aptitude tests and seminars. It also publishes a journal
and newsletters.
Vernon Boddicker, an Arizona dentist whose membership in the
Arizona dental societies had been terminated for failure to pay ADA
dues, brought an action against the three associations. He was joined in
the lawsuit by two other Arizona dentists who had paid dues to the ADA
under protest in order to retain their status as members in good standing
of the state and local societies. The plaintiffs alleged that the agreement
to require membership in the ADA was an unreasonable condition to
membership in the state societies and constituted an anticompetitive tying
arrangement7 in violation of the Sherman Act. They claimed that denial
situation in Boddicker, however, where the defendants had by their own volition imposed
the membership requirements, the defendant State Bar in Bates had merely enforced a
rule promulgated by the Arizona Supreme Court.
5. The organizational structure created by Chapter III of the by-laws of the ADA is
analogous to that of the federal/state governments: federal (ADA), state (constituent
societies) and county (component societies).
6. Article II of the ADA Constitution provides: "The objective of this Association shall
be to encourage the improvement of the health of the public, to promote the art and
science of dentistry and to represent the interests of the members of the dental profession
and the public which it serves."
7. "Tying arrangement" is defined as "an agreement under which a seller agrees to sell
a product or service (the tying item) only on the condition that the buyer agrees ... to
purchase a second (tied) product [or service]." 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS
AND TRADE REGULATION- 6.02[3][c] (1976). In International Salt v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, appeal dismissed, 332 U.S. 747 (1947), the Court held that tying arrangements
are illegal per se. The inclusion of an activity within the per se doctrine has the effect of
eliminating any evaluation of the reasonableness of such activity in connection with a
determination of Sherman Act liability. Thus, once the existence of a tying arrangement is
established, a violation of the Sherman Act is deemed to exist. See 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI,
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION 1 6.02[3] (1976).
The plaintiffs in Boddicker contended that the membership arrangement imposed by the
dental associations constituted a tying arrangement inasmuch as membership in the state
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of membership in the Arizona societies would impair their ability to
practice dentistry since they would be unable to reap the benefits pro-
vided by the state and local societies. 9 Further, they maintained that
expulsion from the Arizona societies would diminish their practices and
professional reputations, resulting in their need for fewer supplies and
less equipment. 10
The district court dismissed the complaint" for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, upholding the contention of the dental societies that the
required payment of ADA membership dues to maintain state and local
society membership did not affect interstate commerce.12 As an addition-
al basis for its dismissal, the court held that the procedures complained of
were not within the ambit of the Sherman Act since they involved the
practice of a learned profession and therefore did not constitute trade or
commerce. 13
IH. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the holding of the
district court, concluded that there was a possibility that the dues arrange-
ment had exerted a substantial economic effect upon interstate commerce
and that therefore it fell within the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman
Act.' 4 In addition, relying on Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 5 and
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. ,16 the Ninth Circuit held that the type of
activity involved was not afforded immunity by any recognized excep-
tion to the application of the Act.'7
and local dental societies (the tying item) can be obtained by dentists only if they also pay
dues to the ADA (the tied item).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. V 1975). See note 2 supra.
9. 549 F.2d at 629.
10. Id. at 629 n.4. See note 27 infra.
1I. Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, [1975-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,229 (D.
Ariz. March 3, 1975), rev'd, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 73 (1977).
12. Id.
13. Id. The minute entry of the district court states, in pertinent part:
It is ordered that the Motion to Dismiss is granted as follows: [Tlhe anti-trust claim
should be dismissed because the activities complained of do not affect interstate
commerce and because the procedures involved in joining professional associations
do not constitute "trade or commerce" within the purview of the anti-trust laws
Id.
14. 549 F.2d at 630.
15. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
16. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
17. In the decision of Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, [1975-1] TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 60,229 (D. Ariz. March 3, 1975), rev'd, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 73 (1977), the district court did not have the advantage of considering Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) and Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579
(1976) since both cases were decided subsequent to the district court's order to grant the
defendants' motion to dismiss.
1977]
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A. Jurisdiction: The Interstate Commerce Requirement
Under the Sherman Act, Congress is given the power to regulate
anticompetitive activities that are "in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States." 18 This language not only sets forth a standard
by which to determine the existence of a substantive offense, it also
establishes the jurisdictional parameters of the Act. 19 The Supreme Court
has, on numerous occasions, 20 found this language illustrative of con-
gressional intent to extend the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act to
the constitutional limits of congressional power under the commerce
clause. 21
The Supreme Court has consistently extended the application of the
Sherman Act to comport with expanding notions of the power granted to
Congress by the commerce clause.22 In Wickard v. Filburn,23 the Court
recognized that activities which had not actually occurred within the flow
of interstate commerce would still be subject to jurisdiction under the Act
if they could be shown to have exerted a "substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce . ... ,2 The Court also noted that while a local
activity, standing alone, might not be sufficient to satisfy the juris-
dictional requirement, it would do so if, when multiplied into a general
practice, it had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
25
The Ninth Circuit concluded in Boddicker, on the basis of the Wick-
ard rationale, that the nexus between the conduct of the dental associa-
tions and the interstate commerce alleged in the complaint was "unques-
tionably adequate."126 In reaching its conclusion, the court cited as
determinative the extensive multistate activities of the ADA and the flow
of funds both to and from the ADA. The court also referred by footnote
27
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975).
19. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 950 (1973); Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. LAW
& ECON. 7, 33 (1966).
20. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2
(1976); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194 (1974); United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3 provide in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have
Power. . . [t]o regulate Commerce. . . among the several states .... "
22. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976).
23. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
24. Id. at 125.
25. Id. at 127-28. Accord, Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 31-37 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972).
26. 549 F.2d at 629.
27. Id. at 629 n.4. Footnote 4 states in pertinent part:
In addition, plaintiffs contend that expulsion from the local societies will diminish
their practice and professional reputation. A less vigorous dental practice necessarily
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to the plaintiffs' contention that the alleged tying arrangement caused a
diminution of the dentists' practices and professional reputations, thereby
decreasing their need for out-of-state supplies, with a concomitant impact
on interstate commerce.
The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit has consistently departed from that
of the other circuits as to the nature of the nexus with interstate commerce
required for Sherman Act jurisdiction.28 Although other circuits have
concluded that the factual issues on the merits are inseparable from the
factual issues on the jurisdictional question,29 the Ninth Circuit has
bifurcated the import of the language "restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States,"3 into the substantive and jurisdictional issues
created.3' Pursuant to this analysis, a violation of the Act has occurred if
defendant's conduct is in restraint of trade under sections 1 and 2 of the
Act.32 On the other hand, to determine the existence of jurisdiction, the
Ninth Circuit has held33 that the presence of a restraint should be assumed
and that the court should focus on whether defendant's conduct is of a
nature sufficient to invoke Congress' power to regulate interstate com-
merce. 34 As a result of this viewpoint, the Ninth Circuit, to a greater
extent than the other circuits, has tended to scrutinize all of the defend-
ant's activities to determine the existence of jurisdiction, rather than
limiting its consideration to those activities of which the plaintiff has
complained, i.e., the alleged restraint.
includes the use of fewer supplies, less equipment, etc. Although the amount of
interstate commerce affected by the deterioration of three dentists' practices may
seem insubstantial, like effects on the practices of similarly situated dentists across
the nation probably will result in the altered flow of dental supplies in interstate
commerce.
Id.
28. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 894 n.20 (3d Cir. 1977).
See generally Comment, The Confusing World of Interstate Commerce and Jurisdiction
Under the Sherman Act-A Look at the Development and Future of the Currently Em-
ployed Jurisdictional Tests, 21 VILL. L. REV. 721, 725 (1976).
29. E.g., McBeath v. Inter-American Citizens for Decency Comm., 374 F.2d 359, 363
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 896 (1967).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. V 1975).
31. Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373, 375 (9thCir. 1973); Rasmussen v. Ameri-
can Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973). In
Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 892-94 (3d Cir. 1977), the
Third Circuit compared the various approaches to the determination of jurisdiction taken
by the circuit courts of appeals, noting that "the Ninth Circuit's approach to the interrela-
tion of Sherman Act claims' merit and their jurisdictional prerequisite differs greatly from
that in the other circuits discussed." Id. at 894 n.20.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. V 1975).
33. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 521-22 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 950 (1973).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3. See note 21 supra.
1977]
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It is difficult to discern the extent of the resulting divergence, how-
ever, because the courts often carelessly refer to defendant's "conduct,"
failing to specify whether they have considered all activities carried on by
the defendant or just that conduct which allegedly constitutes the re-
straint. The dissent in Boddicker contended that "the question is not
simply whether the defendant engages in interstate commerce, but
whether the alleged restraint substantially affects interstate com-
merce. "5 While several circuit courts have expressly acknowledged the
possibility that the nexus required is between the restraint and interstate
commerce,36 the Supreme Court has never expressly addressed the
issue. 37
In Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital,38 the Court
made it clear that it is improper to employ a separate analysis in con-
sidering the jurisdictional and substantive issues, respectively. 39 In that
case, the district court did not articulate the basis upon which it granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss. After electing to treat the dismissal as
having been based on rule 12(b)(6)40 for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, the Supreme Court commented that the
analysis in this case would be no different if we were to regard the
District Court's action as having been a dismissal . . . under Rule
12(b)(1) 4" [for lack of subject matter jurisdiction]. In either event,
the critical inquiry is into the adequacy of the nexus between
35. 549 F.2d at 634 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
36. See, e.g., Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 896 (3d Cir.
1977); Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184, 1188-89 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975).
37. While the Supreme Court has never focused on the issue, there is language in
certain Court opinions which indicates, without elaboration, that the nexus must be
between the conduct constituting a restraint and interstate commerce. See, e.g., Hospital
Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976) ("As long as the restraint in
question 'substantially affects interstate commerce,' . . . the interstate commerce nexus
required for Sherman Act coverage is established."); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 784 (1975) ("The necessary connection between the interstate transactions and
the restraint of trade . . . is present. ... ); United States v. Women's Sportswear
Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 461 (1949) ("We first should be satisfied that the activities on
which restraints are alleged to have been exerted constitute commerce among the
states."). But cf. United States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975) ("The Supreme Court has never decided the question of
whether a business with out-of-state activities which engages in a local conspiracy to
restrain commerce falls within the Sherman Act even though there is no restraining effect
on interstate commerce.").
38. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
39. Id. at 742 n.l.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
41. Id. 12(b)(1).
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[defendants'] conduct and interstate commerce that is alleged in the
complaint. 42
Again, the Court's reference to "conduct" is ambiguous. However, its
subsequent recognition that "[a]s long as the restraint in question 'sub-
stantially and adversely affects interstate commerce,' . . . the interstate
commerce nexus required for Sherman Act coverage is established"'43
tends to support the conclusion that, by its reference to defendants'
"conduct," the Court contemplated that the restraint alleged was the
only activity which could be considered in determining subject matter
jurisdiction.
The circumstances in Boddicker illuminate the anomalous results
which can occur when a defendant's activities as a whole are taken into
consideration in order to invoke jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. 4 To
the extent that the alleged tying arrangement imposed by the dental
associations is successful, the ADA will realize greater revenue. It will
thereby be able to continue and even expand multistate activities. The
free flow of interstate commerce created by the societies' activities will
be burdened only if the dentists succeed in their antitrust action, thereby
presumably causing a reduction in ADA dues which were formerly
remitted by dentists desirous of maintaining their good standing in the
state and local societies. Thus, to the extent that the general activities of
the ADA were considered, the Ninth Circuit relied upon activities which
would only be increased by the continued success of the restraint, thereby
enhancing the flow of interstate commerce.
The logical conclusion to be drawn from the Ninth Circuit's analysis,
namely that any substantial effect upon interstate commerce (even a
positive one) is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, is inconsistent with the
underlying purpose of the Sherman Act. As was acknowledged in Bod-
dicker,4' the legislative history of the Sherman Act indicates that its
adoption was the result of congressional desire to maximize consumer
welfare by prohibiting conduct which creates a restraint on trade.
46
Certainly, consumer welfare is not furthered by the imposition of sanc-
tions upon activities which promote interstate commerce.
47
42. 425 U.S. at 742 n. 1.
43. Id. at 743 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974)).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. V 1975).
45. 549 F.2d at 632 n.10.
46. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. LAW & ECON. 7, 10
(1966).
47. The analysis of the Ninth Circuit in considering the broad range of the defendants'
activities appears, at first blush, to be consistent with the legislative intent to extend the
scope of the act to the limits of power granted by the commerce clause. See note 21 supra
1977]
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Thus, if the Supreme Court were to expressly hold that the restraint
itself must affect interstate commerce (which as yet the Court has only
intimated),' the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit as to the presence of
jurisdiction would be left to stand upon facts which it relegated to the
status of a footnote.49 Since the plaintiffs did not claim that their practice
of dentistry was carried on in the flow of interstate commerce, they must
show, in order to invoke jurisdiction, that the restraint imposed by the
membership arrangement has a substantial effect upon interstate com-
merce.5° Evidently, the only effect pleaded by the plaintiffs was that their
expulsion from the state and local societies would diminish their profes-
sional reputations, and consequently their practices, thereby reducing
their need for supplies and equipment purchased in interstate com-
merce.5 1 It can be argued that the diminution in the practices of those
dentists barred would be balanced by a corresponding increase in the
practices of other dentists. Consequently, there would be no net reduc-
tion in the volume of supplies sold to Arizona dentists through interstate
commerce. However, the requirement could still be met. Pursuant to the
reasoning in Goldfarb,52 if a substantial volume of interstate commerce is
affected by the restraint, no particular magnitude of effect need be
shown.53 Thus, if imposition of the membership scheme alters the flow
of interstate commerce, Sherman Act jurisdiction would be invoked
under the analysis of Goldfarb54 if (and only if) the interstate market for
dental supplies could be considered substantial.
55
and accompanying text. However, it has been recognized that the power vested in
Congress by the commerce clause has a chameleon-like quality, expanding or contracting
to comport with the goal to be achieved:
[W]e must be on guard against the notion that the term [interstate commerce) has a
ready and uniform meaning at all times and in all situations. . . . [T]he concept of
interstate commerce has had to be widened to meet the changing conditions [in the
United States economy]. It must also be pointed out that any notion that it is possible
to frame a definition of interstate commerce which could be uniformly applied in all
questions of state and federal power would hardly fit in with the facts.
M. RAMASWAMY, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
401 (1948).
48. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
49. 549 F.2d at 629 n.4. See note 27 supra.
50. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
51. 549 F.2d at 629 n.4. See note 27 supra.
52. 421 U.S. at 785. Accord, United States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270 (9th
Cir. 1977).
53. The Court based this conclusion on the fact that "[o]therwise, the magnitude of the
effect would control, and our cases have shown that, once an effect is shown, no specific
magnitude need be proved." 421 U.S. at 785.
54. Id.
55. The Supreme Court has not yet held an effect upon interstate commerce as minimal
as that alleged in Boddicker to be sufficient to invoke Sherman Act jurisdiction. However,
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the Court has become willing to accept fewer connections as constituting a substantial
economic effect. See note 58 infra and accompanying text. In Goldfarb, where a signifi-
cant percentage of the funds involved in the purchase of the homes in question came from
sources outside of Virginia, the local activity of attorneys in examining title reports was
held to have been an integral part of a transaction which occurred in interstate commerce
and thereby had a substantial effect upon interstate commerce. The Court recognized
that, under Virginia law, such an examination could be performed only by an attorney and
was necessary in order to obtain financing. 421 U.S. at 483-84. In Hospital Bldg. Co. v.
Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976), the restraint threatened a proposed expansion
of hospital facilities. The hospital had purchased approximately $100,000 per year in
hospital supplies from out-of-state suppliers. If expansion were prohibited, the hospital's
purchases from out-of-state suppliers and its revenue received from out-of-state sources
would be substantially less than if expansion were permitted. The hospital's parent
corporation would receive considerably smaller management fees. Additionally, the
financing of the expansion, provided by out-of-state sources, would not occur. These
factors were deemed sufficient to invoke Sherman Act jurisdiction. Id. at 744.
Those circuit courts which have considered the issue recently seem to have followed the
Supreme Court's lead in expanding the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. Of the eight
circuit court cases in which the issue has been considered subsequent to Goldfarb, the
courts failed in only two to find the presence of a sufficient effect upon interstate
commerce to invoke Sherman Act jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit, in deciding to dismiss
the complaint in Diversified Brokerage Servs., Inc. v. Greater Des Moines Bd. of Real-
tors, 521 F.2d 1343, 1346-47 (8th Cir. 1975), stressed the fact that the plaintiffs had chosen
not to attempt to show that defendant's intrastate activities had placed a substantial
burden on interstate commerce.
In the second action dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Morgan v. Odem,
552 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1977), the decision was justified by the Fifth Circuit's initial
statement: "In spite of an attempt to cast this case in. . . [an] antitrust mold, it concerns
nothing more than a state law construction contract dispute over which the federal court
had no jurisdiction." Id. at 148. The court held that the meager allegation that the
Veterans Administration had acted as guarantor of the loan to finance the construction of
plaintiffs' home was insufficient to show a substantial effect upon interstate commerce.
Id. at 149.
In another action litigated in the Eighth Circuit, Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542
F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1976), the court concluded that the distribution system operated by the
defendant sufficiently affected interstate commerce to invoke Sherman Act jurisdiction.
Under the system, dry cleaning stores located in over 30 states were required to purchase
their equipment solely from the defendant in order to secure a franchise and trademark.
This practice yielded nearly $9,000,000 in sales over a six-year period. Id. at 1346.
In Miller v. Granados, 529 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit found that the
defendants' use of the mails, news and advertising media, and the payment for services,
facilities and materials from out-of-state dealers was sufficient to invoke jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act.
In Taxi Weekly, Inc. v. Metropolitan Taxicab Bd. of Trade, Inc., 539 F.2d 907, 910
(2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit held that a conspiracy which led to the demise of a local
newspaper had sufficient interstate implications for Sherman Act jurisdiction since the
paper often printed out-of-state news and received a large portion of its advertising fees
from out-of-state firms.
The Third Circuit, in Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184, 1189-90 (3d Cir. 1976),
held that interstate commerce had been substantially affected where a food store's annual
out-of-state purchases in excess of $400,000 were jeopardized by the defendant's alleged
leasing practices. The leasing practices were part of a nationwide scheme.
In a subsequent decision, Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884 (3d
Cir. 1977), the Third Circuit found that Sherman Act jurisdiction existed where the
plaintiffs were required to pay the defendant's attorney for related legal services as a
1977]
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As the majority in Boddicker correctly indicated, 6 the fact that the
membership arrangement has been imposed upon the dentists on a
nationwide basis lends credence to the existence of a substantial effect
upon interstate commerce. According to the aggregate theory of impact
upon interstate commerce espoused in Wickard v. Filburn,57 and in light
of the Court's willingness to find increasingly tenuous connections with
interstate commerce as sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional require-
ment, 8 it is possible that the volume of supplies purchased in interstate
commerce by dentists throughout the United States could be considered
substantial enough to invoke jurisdiction under the Act.
Furthermore, federal courts are reluctant to grant dismissals for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction5 9 prior to providing the plaintiff ample oppor-
tunity for discovery, particularly in cases where, as in Boddicker, the
jurisdictional and substantive issues are inextricably interwoven. 60 This
condition to securing a loan from the defendant in order to purchase a home. The court
cited as determinative, among other interstate contacts, the existence of out-of-state
purchasers of homes and the fact that the defendant was a federally chartered institution
governed by federal regulations whose funds were often obtained from the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board in order to make such loans. Id. at 897.
The Fourth Circuit, under circumstances closely analogous to those in Boddicker,
reversed a district court's order of dismissal in Ballard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc.,
543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976). In that case, a group of chiropractors alleged a conspiracy
between several doctors, a medical association and six insurance companies to refuse
insurance coverage for chiropractic services. The court held that interstate commerce
might be substantially affected by the resulting reduction in the sales of therapeutic
devices manufactured outside the State of West Virginia, increased costs to out-of-state
patients and injuries to interstate insurance companies that pay chiropractic claims. Id. at
1077-78.
56. 549 F.2d at 629 n.4 ("Although the amount of interstate commerce affected by the
deterioration of the three dentists' practices may seem insubstantial, like effects on the
practices of similarly situated dentists across the nation probably will result in the altered
flow of dental supplies in interstate commerce.").
57. 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
58. E.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 733, 784 (1975). See generally
Furgeson, The Commerce Test for Jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, 12 Hous. L. REV.
1052 (1975); Note, Portrait of the Sherman Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49
N.Y.U.L. REV. 323 (1974).
In a recent decision, Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977), the Supreme
Court based its rejection of the plaintiffs' contention that the Arizona State Bar should be
subject to liability under the Sherman Act for its ban on legal advertising upon the
conclusion that the state action exemption, set forth in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,351
(1943) (see notes 64-72 infra and accompanying text), encompassed the activities of the
defendants. 97 S. Ct. at 2696. Although the Supreme Court did not discuss the issue of
jurisdiction, the Court must have determined that jurisdiction existed prior to its determi-
nation of the substantive issue of the applicability of the state action exemption. See
Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 889 n.12 (3d Cir. 1977).
59. Rios v. Dillman, 499 F.2d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 1974). See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1350 (1969).
60. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976); Poller v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
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factor would weigh heavily in favor of affirming the Ninth Circuit's
holding. It has been stated that "[w]here the jurisdictional issue . . .
cannot be decided without the ruling constituting at the same time a
ruling on the merits of the case, the case should be heard and determined
on the merits through regular trial procedure."61
In order to determine whether the tying arrangement alleged in Bod-
dicker violates the Sherman Act, the plaintiffs must show that the
membership procedures employed by the dental associations impose a
restraint. This same restraint must have a substantial effect upon inter-
state commerce in order to invoke jurisdiction. As the Third Circuit
stated in Mortensen v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association :62
[I]t is because the nexus [that the plaintiffs] will have to establish to
succeed on the merits is at least in part the same nexus they must
allege or even prove to withstand jurisdictional attacks, that we feel
it is incumbent upon the trial judge to demand less in the way of
jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at a trial stage.
63
While Mortensen and other decisions support the conclusion reached in
Boddicker, this does not alter the fact that the mode of analysis employed
by the Ninth Circuit is not derived from firm precedent.
B. Immunity Under the State Action Exemption
According to the holding in Parker v. Brown,' when Congress enact-
ed the Sherman Act it did not intend to restrain "state action or official
action directed by a state.' '65 Since the Parker decision, courts have
struggled with the extent to which the doctrine should be applied. Until
recently, most courts had held that the exemption extended to all ac-
tivities of private parties taken pursuant to state legislation which either
required, approved or authorized the acts taken.
66
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,67 the Supreme Court clearly stated
that the exemption was limited to anticompetitive conduct which had
61. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Railway Express Agency, 253 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir.
1958), quoted with approval in McBeath v. Inter-American Citizens for Decency Comm.,
374 F.2d 359, 363 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 896 (1967).
62. 549 F.2d 884 (3d Cir. 1977).
63. Id. at 892.
64. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
65. Id. at 351.
66. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 251 (4th
Cir. 1971); Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299, 302 (D. Mass.),
aff'd mem., 242 F.2d 748 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957). See generally
Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1976).
67. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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been compelled by direction of the state acting as sovereign.68 The scope
of the doctrine was further narrowed in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. 
69
where, although the activity challenged by plaintiff could not have been
abandoned without prior approval of a state regulatory commission, the
defendant was held responsible for the restraint imposed since it had
exercised sufficient freedom of choice in deciding to initiate the anticom-
petitive activity.70 In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona ,7 although state
action immunity was held to extend to the ban on legal advertising which
had been enforced by the Arizona State Bar, the Supreme Court reaffirm-
ed the position it had taken in Cantor and Goldfarb that no exemption
would exist to protect a defendant who had acted in an area where state
policy was neutral.72
Unlike the situation in Bates, where the defendant was compelled to
act according to rules promulgated by the Arizona Supreme Court, 73 the
conduct allegedly constituting a restraint in Boddicker was not compel-
led by the Arizona State Legislature or any agency of the State of
Arizona. The practice of dentistry was not subject to a regulatory scheme
by which the State of Arizona had even condoned the requirement of
membership in the ADA as a condition precedent to membership in the
state and local associations ." In light of the freedom of choice exercised
by the dental associations in establishing their membership requirements
68. Id. at 791.
69. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
70. Id. at 598.
71. 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
72. 428 U.S. at 598.
73. 17A ARIZ. REv. STAT. Sup. Ct. Rules, rule 27(a) (1973) provides in pertinent part:
"[T]he Supreme Court of Arizona does hereby. . . create. . . an organization known as
the State Bar of Arizona. . . . The State Bar of Arizona may. . . promote and further
the aims as set forth herein and hereinafter in these rules." Id.
Id. rule 29(a) provides in pertinent part: "The duties and obligations of members shall
be as prescribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Associa-
tion. . . " Id.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-101(B) provides in pertinent part:
"A lawyer shall not publicize himself . . . as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine
advertisements . . . ." Id.
In Bates, two Arizona attorneys alleged that the enforcement of Disciplinary Rule 2-101
constituted a Sherman Act violation by the Arizona State Bar. The Court concluded that
since the disciplinary rule had been promulgated by the Arizona Supreme Court pursuant
to authority granted by the Arizona Constitution and the bar had been affirmatively
commanded by the Arizona Supreme Court to enforce the rule, the bar was not subject to
liability under the Act for the restraint it had imposed.
74. Although the Arizona State Legislature authorized the formation of a Board of
Examiners to which it granted the authority to regulate the practice of dentistry, ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 32-1207 (1976), no mention was made of the membership qualifications of the
state or local societies or their arrangements for paying dues.
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and the fact that the State of Arizona had been neutral and uninvolved in
that choice, the Ninth Circuit correctly observed in Boddicker that the
state action doctrine afforded no exemption "to shelter the practices
being challenged."
7 5
C. Immunity of the Practice of a Learned Profession
Defendants whose challenged activities fall within the practice of a
"learned profession" have consistently argued76 that such activities do
not constitute "trade or commerce" and are therefore not within the
scope of the Act. They contend that the principal goal in the practice of a
profession is neither competition nor profit, but the provision of services
necessary to the community. Therefore, the imposition of antitrust laws
designed to further competition would be at odds with their professional
goal.
The genesis of this argument seems to be the construction placed upon
the phrase "restraint of trade" found in section 3 of the Sherman Act77
by the Supreme Court in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United
States :78 "Whenever any occupation, employment, or business is carried
on for the purpose of profit or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts
or in the learned professions, it is constantly called a trade." 79 However,
the Supreme Court has refused to accept the existence of an all-encom-
passing exemption from antitrust liability based solely on the nature of
the defendant's occupation. 80 In fact, the Court has not yet encountered a
case in which it has decided that application of the learned profession
exemption was appropriate. 81 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,82 how-
ever, it implicitly recognized the existence of the exemption by noting
that "[i]t would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as
75. 549 F.2d at 632.
76. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 785-86 (1975); American Medical
Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1970) provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any
Territory of the United States . . . is declared illegal .... "Id.
78. 286 U.S. 427 (1932).
79. Id. at 436 (quoting The Schooner Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506, 507 (C.C.D. Me. 1834)
(No. 10,388)).
80. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-87 (1975).
81. The recent decision in Bates is indicative of the Court's tendency to avoid the
application of a learned profession exemption. While the Court found that the State Bar's
prohibition of attorney advertising was excluded from Sherman Act liability on the basis
of the Parker doctrine, immunity could as easily have been based on the learned profes-
sion exemption. The Court, however, did not even acknowledge the existence of such an
exemption.
82. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply
to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas." 83
In determining whether the Sherman Act applies to the practice of a
profession, courts -have generally fodused on the commercial or non-
commercial nature of the activity which has allegedly imposed a restraint
on trade. 4 Application of the learned profession exemption to non-
commercial activities has'been justified by recognizing the underlying
purpose of the Act:85 "The end sought was the prevention of restraints to
free competition in business and commercial transactions. ... 86 The
"commercial versus non-commercial" rationale was followed in Gold-
farb. Upon noting that previous Supreme Court cases specifically in-
cluded "services" within the scope of section 1 of the Act, 87 the Court
held that -that aspect of a lawyer's practice involving commercial inter-
course, i.e., the exchange of a service for money, is subject to regulation
under the Act.
88
The analysis employed by the majority in Boddicker narrows the
scope of the learned profession exemption to an even greater extent than
the "commercial versus non-commercial" test. Recognizing that Gold-
farb8 9 offered little guidance in determining the compatibility of particular
practices of a profession with the Sherman Act, the Ninth Circuit looked
to the decision in Cantor9° for further direction.9' The majority contend-
ed that although application of the learned profession immunity was not
at issue in Cantor, the reasoning of the Court in refusing to apply the
state action exception was closely analogous to the rationale of Goldfarb
in refusing to apply the learned profession exception. 92 On the basis of
Cantor, the court concluded that in order for an activity within the
practice of a "profession" to survive a Sherman Act challenge, it "must
83. Id. at 787 n.17.
84. Ballard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075, 1079 (4th Cir. 1976); Jones
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975).
85. Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975).
86. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940) (emphasis added).
87. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1957); American
Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1943).
88. 421 U.S. at 788. In Goldfarb, the plaintiffs alleged that they were unable to obtain
legal services at a rate less than that recommended by the fee schedule published by the
county bar and enforced by the state bar. The plaintiffs sued both the state and county bar
associations, contending that the operation of the minimum fee schedule constituted price
fixing in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court stated that "the exchange of [a
legal] service for money is 'commerce' in the most common usage of that word," and
therefore falls within the scope of the Act. Id. at 787-88.
89. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
90. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
91. 549 F.2d at 630-31.
92. Id. at 631-32 (discussing Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792-93).
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serve the purpose for which the profession exists, viz. to serve the
public.'"
In light of the rigorous standard imposed to determine if a claim should
be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action,94 howe.er, the
practical effect of the difference between application of the "commercial
versus non-commercial" test and the "purpose of existence" test em-
ployed by the Ninth Circuit is minimal. The Boddicker court remanded
since the dental associations' pleadings did not show that their member-
ship scheme unquestionably existed to further the purpose of the dental
associations, that is, to improve the practice of dentistry.95 Had the
"commercial versus non-commercial" test been employed, it is doubtful
that the court would have decided that the exchange of benefits offered
by ADA membership for the dentists' money was non-commercial in
nature. Therefore, the use of either test in this instance would have led to
the same conclusion: the trial court's decision to dismiss for failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action should be reversed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The rationale utilized in Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Associa-
tion evidences the tendency of the Ninth Circuit to circumvent the
limitation on the scope of the Sherman Act which requires a nexus
between the restraint and interstate commerce. The court's consideration
of the broad range of activities carried on by the ADA enabled it to justify
its decision as to the existence of jurisdiction under the Act, at least in
part, upon interstate transactions which would be augmented by the
increased flow of funds resulting from the success of the alleged tying
arrangement. Such an interpretation is clearly contrary to the legislative
objective of the Act, i.e., the prevention of restraints on competition.
The conclusion reached in Boddicker, however, demonstrates the
increasingly pervasive interpretation of the purview of the Sherman Act
which has been employed by courts in recent years. Not only did the
Ninth Circuit take an expansive view of the interstate commerce require-
ment, it constricted the applicability of the learned profession exemption,
with the ultimate effect of placing more controversies within the scope of
the Sherman Act and allowing fewer defendants to escape liability.
Julie C. McIntyre
93. 549 F.2d at 632.
94. Pursuant to the holding in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), a complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief." Id. at 45-46.
95. 549 F.2d at 632.
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